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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Master and Servant-Presumption as to Scope
of Employment
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in the recent case of
Jeffrey v. Osage Manufacturing Co.1 has decided that upon proof
of defendant's ownership of the car that caused the plaintiff's injury
and that the negligent driver thereof was in the general employ of
defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to the "permissive" presumption2
that said driver was acting within the scope of his employment at
the time of the accident and has therefor established a prima facie
case to be presented to the jury.
The decision is in accord with the majority elsewhere 3 The
reason for this rule is quite evident: that whether the car was at the
time of the injury being used in furtherance of the master's business
and according to his instructions involves matter peculiarly within
the defendant's knowledge and upon which it is generally difficult
for the plaintiff to obtain proof. 4 "The prima facie inference that
may be drawn from ownership is analogous to the prima facie infer-
ence of negligence that may be drawn from the happening of an
accident of a certain class, where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applies.5
Variations of the above rule are met in a number of jurisdic-
tions. Pennsylvania, while approving the doctrine in cases of cars
used for business purposes,6 and during business hours,7 disaffirms it
where the car is a family or pleasure vehicle.8 Massachusetts,9 while
197 N. C. 724, 150 S. E. 503 (1929).
'See McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof (1927)
5 N. C. L. REv. 291.
'D'Aleria v. Shirey, 286 Fed. 523 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923) ; Orlando v. Pioneer
Barber Towel Supply Co., 239 N. Y. 342, 146 N. E. 621 (1925); Yellow Cab
Co. v. Nelson, 35 Ga. App. 694, 134 S. E. 822 (1926) ; Crowell v. Duncan, 145
Va. 489, 134 S. E. 576 (1926) ; Fame Laundry Co. v. Henry, 195 Ind. 456, 144
N. E. 545 (1924) ; Wagnitz v. Scharetz, 265 Pac. 318 (Cal. App. 1928) ; Note
L. R. A. 1918D 924.
'Long v. Nute, 123 Mo. App. 204, 100 S. W. 511 (1907) ; Bogorad v. Dix,
176 N. Y. App. Div. 774, 162 N. Y. Supp. 992 (1917).
'Robb, J., in Curry v. Stevenson, 26 F. (2d) 534, 536 (Ct. of App. D. C.
1928).
'Seiber v. Russ Bros. Ice Cream Co., 276 Pa. 340, 120 At. 272 (1923);
Lauhach v. Colley, 283 Pa. 366, 129 Atl. 88 (1925).
'Williams v. Ludwig Floral Co., 252 Pa. 140, 97 Atl. 206 (1924).
" Lotz v. Hanlon, 217 Pa. St. 339, 66 Atl. 525, 10 Ann. Cas. 731, 10 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 202 (1907).
' Subsequent to the writing of this case comment Massachusetts, in the case
of Thomas v. The Meyer Stores, Inc.. Mass. Adv. Sh. (1929) 2023, has ap-
plied its recent statute, Mass. St. 1928, c. 317, which provides that: In all
actions to recover damages for injuries to the person or the property, or for
the death of a person arising out of an accident or collision in which a motor
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generally refusing to follow this rule,10 did so where the master's tools--
were in the truck.1 A leading Ohio case' 2 holds that the presump-
tion does not arise unless it is shown that one of the duties of the
driver is the operation of the car. A different rule is often invoked.
where the car is operated by a member of the defendant's family,1"
although proof of defendant's ownership of car and its operation
by his wife has been held to raise the presumption that the wife
was driving as the husband's agent.' 4 A number of jurisdictions allow
the prima facie inference to be raised from mere proof of ownership
of the automobile.' 5
Those courts which refuse the plaintiff the benefit of the pre-
sumption assign as a reason that the jury might thereby find for the
plaintiff on mere speculation and conjecture.'0 Inasmuch as the
presumption is rebuttable and opportunity is afforded the defendant
for the introduction of evidence tending to disprove the plaintiff's
allegations concerning the driver's scope of authority, a refusal to
invoke the rule would give rise to the greater possibility of non-suit
of a plaintiff with a good cause of action because of his inability to
procure evidence accessible only to the defendant.' 7
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vehicle was involved, evidence that at the time of such accident or collision it
was registered in the name of the defendant as owner shall be primna fade
evidence that it was being operated by and under the control of a person for
whose conduct the defendant was legally responsible, and absence of such re-
sponsibility shall be an affirmative defence to 'be set up in the answer and
proved by the defendant."
"Porcino v. DeStefano, 243 Mass. 398, 137 N. E. 664 (1923).
'"Brien v. Dedham Water Co., 241 Mass. 217, 135 N. E. 130 (1922).
'White Oak Coal Co. v. Rivoux, 88 Ohio St. 18, 102 N. E. 302, 46 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1091, Ann. Cas. 1914C 1082 (1914).
'Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1, 200 S. W. 286, L. R. A. 1918C 715, Ann. Cas.
1918E. 1127 (1917).1
"Willet v. Heyer, 140 Atl. 411 (Ct. App. N. J. 1928); Clark v. Sweaney,
175 N. C. 280, 95 S. E. 568 (1918). The presumption of liability clearly exists
in those states invoking the "family purpose doctrine.' Landry v. Overseen,
187 Iowa 284, 174 N. W. 255 (1919); King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 20
S. W. 296, L. R. A. 1918F 293 (1918).
"
5Lilly v. Duckworth, 140 Atl. 397 (Ct. App. N. J. 1928) ; Ercole v. Daniel,
105 W. Va. 118, 141 S. E. 631 (1928). See Clark v. Sweaney, sura note 12.
Note L. R. A. 1918D 924.
" Porcino v. DeStefano, supra note 8; Ronan v. J. G. Turnbull Co., 99 Vt.
280, 131 Atl. 788 (1926); Welch v. Checker Taxi Co., 159 N. E. 622 (Mass.
1928).
1"The weight, effect, and significance to be given the presumption are of
course dependent upon local laws, practices, and rules of evidence. See Heckel
and Harper, Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1928) 22 ILL. L. Rxv.
724; (1930) 10 BOSTON U. L. Rv. 83.
